TOPIC: Top 10 Philippine Supreme Court jurisprudence discussing the proper execution of a warrant of arrest: Part 3 of 10
CAN A COURT BE FORCED
TO SUSPEND THE ENFORCEMENT OF A WARRANT OF ARREST JUST BECAUSE A PETITION FOR
REVIEW IS PENDING BEFORE THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE?
Case Title: ENRIQUE V. VIUDEZ II, Petitioner, v.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and HON. BASILIO R. GABO, JR., in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 11, Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan G.R.
No. 152889 | June 5, 2009
Facts of the Case
On June 9, 2000, Mayor
Honorato Galvez and his driver were shot dead in San Ildefonso, Bulacan.
Shortly thereafter, two separate complaints for murder were filed—first by the
PNP-CIDG, and later by Estrella Galvez, the widow of the deceased, who specifically
named Enrique Viudez II among the accused.
By March 31, 2001, the
Investigating Prosecutor found probable cause against Viudez and others. This
led to the filing of two murder Informations before RTC Branch 11, Malolos,
Bulacan, on September 19, 2001. The court issued warrants of arrest the same day.
Viudez, however, invoked Department
of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 70, which provides that court proceedings
should be held "in abeyance" pending a DOJ Petition for Review. On
September 21, 2001, he moved to suspend the proceedings and the enforcement of
the arrest warrant, claiming that a pending DOJ review justified such relief.
RTC Judge Basilio R. Gabo
denied the motion on September 28, 2001, emphasizing that (1) jurisdiction over
Viudez had not yet been acquired, and (2) no compelling reason existed to
recall a valid warrant. Viudez’s motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Viudez then filed a Petition
for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), claiming grave abuse of
discretion by the RTC. The CA initially issued a TRO against the
enforcement of the arrest warrant. However, by December 19, 2001, it dismissed
the petition for lack of merit, ruling that a DOJ circular cannot override
judicial discretion. The CA emphasized that no law or jurisprudence mandated
the suspension of arrest warrants just because a DOJ Petition for Review is
pending.
Meanwhile, the DOJ
eventually resolved Viudez’s Petition for Review in his favor on September
13, 2002, ordering the withdrawal of the murder Informations. The trial
court granted the motion to withdraw the Informations on October 23, 2002.
Despite this, Viudez pursued the case to the Supreme Court, asking for a
categorical ruling on whether DOJ Circular No. 70 could justify the suspension
of arrest warrants.
Main Issue
Whether a pending
Petition for Review before the Secretary of Justice suspends the implementation
of a warrant of arrest previously issued by a trial court.
Supreme Court Ruling
The Supreme Court
DENIED the petition. It
ruled that the authority to determine probable cause for purposes of issuing
a warrant of arrest lies solely with the judge, and the implementation
of such a warrant cannot be suspended merely due to a pending DOJ review.
DOJ Circular No. 70 does not bind courts to halt the execution of their orders.
The Court stressed that
allowing an executive circular to suspend judicial processes would violate
the doctrine of separation of powers. The discretion to suspend court
proceedings—including warrants—is judicial, not executive.
Dispositive Portion
“WHEREFORE, the Petition
for Review on Certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction dated April 25, 2002 is
DENIED – the Petition for Review, for lack of merit; and the issuance of TRO
and/or preliminary injunction, for being moot and academic.”
Should a person facing
a non-bailable offense be allowed to delay arrest just because they filed a DOJ
appeal—despite the judge’s finding of probable cause? Is this a loophole or a
safeguard of rights?
Key Doctrines Cited
- “The determination of probable
cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is a judicial function.”
– Only judges, not prosecutors or executive officers, can issue and control arrest warrants. - “Preliminary investigation is
executive in nature; the issuance of arrest warrants is judicial.”
– There is a clear demarcation between the roles of prosecutors (who determine whether to prosecute) and judges (who determine whether to arrest). - “A DOJ circular cannot bind the
court or divest it of discretion.”
– Administrative issuances cannot override the constitutional independence of the judiciary. - “Filing of a Petition for Review
with the DOJ does not suspend court proceedings as a matter of right.”
– Courts may, in their discretion, defer proceedings, but they are not obligated to do so.
Classification: Remedial Law
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Read full text of the decision here
π LAW SCHOOL DOCTRINE RECALL SERIES
INTRODUCTION:
In this video, we explore Viudez II v. Court of Appeals, a landmark Remedial
Law case that clarifies judicial discretion in the implementation of arrest
warrants—an essential concept for law students, bar candidates, and baristas.
We’ll break down 10 core doctrines to aid in faster recall and deeper
understanding.
π CASE OVERVIEW:
Title: Enrique V. Viudez II vs. Court of Appeals and Hon. Basilio R.
Gabo, Jr.
G.R. No.: 152889
Date: June 5, 2009
Nature: Remedial Law – Criminal Procedure / Judicial Discretion /
Arrest Warrants
Summary:
Viudez, accused of murder, sought to stop his arrest by invoking DOJ
Department Circular No. 70, citing a pending Petition for Review before the
Secretary of Justice. The trial court and CA denied his motion. The Supreme
Court upheld that judges—not DOJ circulars—control warrant enforcement.
Main Issue:
Can a DOJ Petition for Review suspend the enforcement of a validly issued
warrant of arrest?
The Supreme Court ruled NO—judicial discretion prevails.
π Should executive issuances be allowed to restrict
judicial processes like arrest enforcement? Comment below!
π IMPORTANT DOCTRINES IN VIUDEZ II v.
CA (G.R. No. 152889)
- Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause Is Exclusive
Only judges—not prosecutors or the DOJ—have authority to determine probable cause for arrest.
π Source: Viudez II v. CA, citing People v. Inting - Arrest Warrant Implementation Is a
Judicial Act
The court’s decision to enforce a warrant cannot be deferred by DOJ circulars or pending appeals.
π Viudez II ruling, para. on judicial discretion - Preliminary Investigation ≠
Preliminary Inquiry
Preliminary investigation (DOJ) determines if the accused should be charged; preliminary inquiry (court) decides on arrest.
π Viudez II, citing AAA v. Carbonell - Department Circulars Are Not
Binding on Courts
Circulars like DOJ No. 70 guide prosecutors—not judges. Courts are not compelled to follow them.
π Viudez II, ruling on Section 9 of DOJ Circular - Court Discretion Is Supreme After
Filing of Information
Once a case is filed, any dismissal or motion—including withdrawal of information—is under the court’s sound discretion.
π Citing Marcelo v. CA, Crespo v. Mogul - Filing a DOJ Review Does Not Halt
Warrant Execution
Pending DOJ review does not suspend the court’s valid issuance and implementation of a warrant.
π Main holding of Viudez II - TROs Cannot Nullify Court’s
Original Jurisdiction
A TRO by the CA or SC may delay, but not nullify, the original judicial power to order arrests.
π Procedural history in Viudez II - No Due Process Violation in Warrant
Enforcement
Enforcing a valid warrant based on court-determined probable cause does not violate due process—even if DOJ review is pending.
π Viudez II, discussion on liberty and due process - Judicial Discretion Requires No
Deference to Executive Opinions
The judge’s duty to evaluate probable cause and act on motions stands independent of DOJ positions.
π Viudez II, reaffirming judicial independence - Final DOJ Resolution Can Lead to
Case Withdrawal, Not Automatic Dismissal
Only upon a motion to withdraw can a case be dropped—and the court can still deny such motion.
π Viudez II, citing Ledesma v. CA, Solar Team v. How
π DISCLAIMER:
This content is for educational purposes only and not guaranteed to
be infallible. Created using premium AI tools. Always consult
official sources or legal counsel for authoritative interpretations.
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